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As more and more people use social media to communicate their view and perception of elections, 
researchers have increasingly been collecting and analyzing data from social media platforms. Our 
research focuses on social media communication related to the 2013 election of the German parlia-
ment [translation: Bundestagswahl 2013]. We constructed several social media datasets using data 
from Facebook and Twitter. First, we identified the most relevant candidates (n=2,346) and checked 
whether they maintained social media accounts. The Facebook data was collected in November 2013 
for the period of January 2009 to October 2013. On Facebook we identified 1,408 Facebook walls 
containing approximately 469,000 posts. Twitter data was collected between June and December 2013 
finishing with the constitution of the government. On Twitter we identified 1,009 candidates and 76 
other agents, for example, journalists. We estimated the number of relevant tweets to exceed eight 
million for the period from July 27 to September 27 alone. In this document we summarize past re-
search in the literature, discuss possibilities for research with our data set, explain the data collection 
procedures, and provide a description of the data and a discussion of issues for archiving and dissemi-
nation of social media data. 
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Political communication has become a major focus in the growing field of social media studies. Re-
searchers across disciplines and across the globe analyze political online communication with a spe-
cific focus on elections – particularly since election campaigns increasingly take place in social media, 
a process that was prominently recognized during the US election campaign in 2008.  
Our goal is to examine various aspects of the communication structures in online media and how such 
data can add new insights in comparison to existing data from surveys and (traditional) media anal-
yses. By collecting data from both Twitter and Facebook we also add new dimensions to current stud-
ies on social media use during elections. Our approach is situated in the broader framework of the 
German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES), a long term research project that examines the German 
federal elections in 2009, 2013, and 2017 with the aim to track the German electoral process over an 
extended period of time (Schmitt-Beck, Rattinger, Roßteutscher & Weßels, 2010). By collecting Twit-
ter and Facebook data about the German Bundestag elections we can supplement traditional research 
data as used in the GLES. Specifically, the candidate study of the GLES (based on interviews with 
candidates) can be compared to the actual behavior of candidates on Twitter and Facebook. Similarly, 
the media corpus analysis of the GLES (analyzing different mass media channels) may be compared 
with the social media corpus.  
Despite a growing research body, there is a lack of shared methods and standards in analyzing elec-
toral races with social media – which means that researchers are still exploring different approaches 
and that it is not always easy to compare results across studies. In some cases, comparison is difficult 
due to new and different perspectives on the research topic and due to novel research questions. In 
other cases, a lack of documented methods leads researchers to developing similar approaches in par-
allel without profiting from each other’s experiences. In addition, data from social media platforms are 
mostly unavailable for secondary analyses. Traditional publication formats often do not allow re-
searchers to describe processes of data collection and manipulation in sufficient detail. With this paper 
we try to overcome the lack of documentation of the collection procedures by providing an overview 
of our applied approaches to collecting data from Twitter and Facebook in order to prepare a dataset 
for studying the 2013 German Bundestag elections.  
Among the platforms that have already been the target of other studies in relation to elections are 
blogs (Adamic & Glance, 2005; Albrecht, Hartig-Perschke & Lübcke, 2008; Farrell, Lawrence & 
Sides, 2010), YouTube (Bachl, 2011), Facebook (Williams & Gulati, 2009) and Twitter. Early re-
search on Twitter during elections focused on the US (which is still popular, see e.g., Conway, Kenski 
& Wang, 2013) and on elections in more instable and also totalitarian systems such as the Iranian 
elections (Gaffney, 2010) and elections in Ghana (Ifokur, 2010). By now there is also a significant 
number of case studies for individual countries all over the world, like Sweden (Larsson & Moe, 
2012), the Netherlands (Tjong Kim Sang & Bos, 2012), Australia (Bruns & Highfield, 2013; Burgess 
& Bruns, 2012), India (IRIS & IAMAI, 2013), Canada (Elmer, 2013), Singapur (Sreekumar & Vadre-
vu,  2013), and South Korea (Hsu & Park, 2012).  
Only few studies include comparisons that take into account the interwoven landscape of social me-
dia, such as taking into account YouTube links on Facebook (Robertson, Vatrapu & Medina, 2010). 
Studies that compare results across countries are also rare, although there are first approaches: Larsson 
and Moe (2014) look at three Scandinavian countries, Nooralahzadeh, Arunachalam and Chiru (2012) 
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compare the US and French elections, and a panel at the Internet Research conference 2013
1
 brought 
together perspectives from four different countries. While these studies look at the context of elections 
as acute events, others also consider general political discussions (e.g., Highfield, Bruns & Harring-
ton, 2012; Paßmann, Boeschoten & Schäfer, 2014) or the overall setting of e-participation and e-
government (Beattie, Macnamara & Sakinofsky, 2012).  
The role of online communication and internet technology in German politics has also been studied 
from different perspectives (Albrecht & Schweizer, 2011; Jungherr & Schoen, 2013; Meckel et al., 
2012). The German federal government structure allows to compare elections across the different 
states, like Elter (2013) has done for seven different German federal state elections. The project “Po-
litical Deliberation on the Internet: Forms and Functions of Digital Discourse Based on the Mi-
croblogging System Twitter” also monitors several regional as well as the various state elections and 
analyzes the broader impact of Twitter on political debates in Germany (Thimm, Einspänner & Dang-
Anh, 2012). Siri and Seßler (2013) as well as Thamm and Bleier (2013) focus on a set of politicians 
rather than on selected events like elections. Dang-Xuan et al. (2013) combine the two dimensions and 
take a closer look at influential individuals during an electoral event in order to investigate emotionali-
ty and discussed topics. There are a number of ongoing projects collecting tweets around the 2013 
German Bundestag election and some new publications can be expected in the near future.  
Previous research has also been inspired by the challenge to use social media to predict election re-
sults (e.g., Birmingham & Smeaton, 2011; Tumasjan et al., 2011) which has resulted in a considerable 
amount of skepticism and some counter examples (e.g., Jungherr, Jürgens & Schoen, 2012; Metaxas, 
Mustafaraj & Gayo-Avello, 2011). Predictions are a particular case that shows how selected methods 
and applied modes for data collection (e.g., based upon keywords vs. users, selection of time span) 
influence the potential outcome of a study. Much more research is conducted, however, not to predict 
election outcomes but to investigate the roles of politicians, media and publics from various perspec-
tives, for example, by focusing on deliberation and participation. In all cases, however, the chosen 
methods highly influence what types of conclusions can be drawn. Current approaches comprise quan-
titative analyses (e.g., number of interactions, network analyses), qualitative analyses (e.g., content 
analysis of posts) and combined methods – some of them automated, others carried out manually. In 
all approaches the modes of data collection also have an effect on the scope and limits of the study; if 
data collection from Twitter is, for example, based on one single hashtag, one needs to be aware that 
parts of the conversation are lost, as the same topic is likely to be discussed under the heading of dif-
ferent hashtags and not every user includes the same hashtag despite the fact that he or she is referring 
to the same discussion or topic.  
This paper is intended to enable the reader to understand the scope of the available data and to provide 
an accurate assessment of the potential and the limitations of the data. In the following sections we 
describe the sources of our data and the rationale of the data collection approach. We then outline the 
more specific aspects of data generated in Facebook and Twitter together with a short technical de-
scription. As much as it is desirable to archive collected data and to make it accessible for secondary 
analysis to other researchers social media data pose new challenges and questions in this regard. 
Therefore, we discuss the issues of archiving and dissemination in the last section.  
 
                                                          
 
1 https://www.conftool.com/aoir-ir14/index.php?page=browseSessions&form_session=36 
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As outlined above the goal of data collection was to collect social media communication which is 
closely related to the German Bundestag election on September 22nd, 2013. To this end we construct-
ed different data sets which we refer to as the “Facebook corpus of candidates” (corpus 1), the “Twit-
ter corpus of candidates” (corpus 2), the “Twitter corpus of media agents” (corpus 3), the “Twitter 
hashtag corpus of basic political topics” (corpus 4), the “Twitter hashtag corpus of media topics” 
(corpus 5), and the “Twitter hashtag corpus about NSA / Snowden” (corpus 6). Corpus 1 includes data 
collected from the Facebook walls of candidates for the German Bundestag. For the other corpora we 
collected Twitter data. Corpus 2 is comprised of tweets from candidates for the German Bundestag. 
Corpus 3 is comprised of tweets from news producers such as journalists. Corpora 4 to 6 contain 
tweets identified by a list of hashtags which was constructed following a topical approach. Technical-
ly, we collected tweets sent from account names of our lists (see below), tweets in which those names 
were mentioned (i.e., which included the @-prefix) and tweets which matched our hashtag lists (i.e., 
which included the #-prefix). 
In preparation for our collection effort, we identified the most relevant candidates (n=2,346) and 
checked whether they maintained social media accounts. On Facebook we collected information from 
1,408 Facebook walls. The Facebook data was collected in November 2013 for the period of January 
1, 2009 to December 31, 2013, thus reaching back to the previous election in 2009 as well. On Twitter 
we followed a set of 1,009 candidates and 76 other agents, for example, journalists. The Twitter data 
collection period started on 20 June 2013 and ended on 17 December 2013 (i.e., about 3 months be-
fore and after the election), the day Angela Merkel was voted chancellor by the Bundestag and which 
was the beginning of the new government. 
 
Before actual social media data can be collected, researchers need to decide about the scope of the 
data corpus. Therefore, we had to construct a list of names of the relevant candidates. This list was the 
starting point for our search of the social media accounts for both corpus 1 and 2. Relevance was de-
fined as the reasonable likelihood of becoming a member of the Bundestag (see appendix for more 
details). We refer to this list as the list of candidates although the complete number of overall candi-
dates was higher. The data was collected in a two-stage process.  
In the first stage, the names of the Bundestag candidates and details of their candidature (list or direct 
candidature; constituency) were searched on the webpages of the party state associations (six parties x 
16 state associations).
2
 If the candidates were not announced online, the names were requested via 
email or telephone call at the press and campaign offices. Since the direct candidates are elected sepa-
rately in every constituency and since the party congresses, where the list candidates are elected, take 
place at different times, our list of candidate names was continuously extended. Although an official 
list of Bundestag candidates is published by the Bundeswahlleiter (federal returning officer) six weeks 
before the elections, we decided to investigate the candidate names ourselves. We did this in order to 
be able to start data collection of social media data simultaneously to the start of the GLES media 
                                                          
 
2 Subsequently, we extended our collection efforts to include the AfD as seventh party (see appendix and section 
0). 
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content analysis in June 2013 and in order to collect data sufficiently in advance before the election 
would take place.  
In the second stage, the Facebook and Twitter accounts of the candidates were identified based on the 
list of candidates. In addition to the internal Facebook and Twitter search function, the list of social 
media accounts of current members of parliament on the website pluragraph.de was useful. Further-
more, several of the politicians’ or parties’ websites linked to their social media accounts.  
We applied the following criteria to verify that the accounts were related to the target person: (1) Is a 
reference to the party, for example a party logo visible? Are Facebook friends and Twitter followers 
members of this party? (2) Do the candidate’s personal or party website link to the profile? (3) Can the 
candidate be recognized via image or constituency (for direct candidates)? Where available, the veri-
fied badge in Twitter was used to select the correct account of a candidate in cases of multiple availa-
ble accounts. 
If the candidate had an account which he or she used for private purposes in addition to his profes-
sional account
3
, only the professional account was included in our list. During our search for the ac-
counts, this problem occurred primarily with Facebook accounts. Since a list of candidates of the 2009 
Bundestag election was already available from the 2009 GLES candidate study, we also searched 
Facebook accounts for these candidates. 
 
Since Twitter is a fast moving medium which takes up and redistributes new information quickly, it is 
likely that conventional media also use Twitter as a data source. We assume that conventional media 
select information from Twitter and refine and redistribute the topics over the more conventional 
media. Corpus 3 was designed to reflect this. We refer to the individuals who would follow such an 
information gathering approach as “gatekeepers” and searched for them among journalists and editors. 
In a first step, we identified journalists and editors working in internal political divisions of national 
daily newspapers and magazines (see appendix) and searched their Twitter accounts. The leading 
principle in selecting the media sources was whether they were included in the print media content 
analysis of GLES. The result of this first step is a list of all Twitter gatekeepers of conventional me-
dia. 
In a second step, we retrieved all accounts that the gatekeepers followed. The assumption behind this 
approach is that the gatekeepers themselves track what we call “information authorities”. The infor-
mation authorities push topics into Twitter and it is likely that they play a central role in shaping the 
agenda on Twitter. In order to be counted in the list of information authorities we introduced the crite-
rion that at least 25 percent of the gatekeepers have to follow the account. The list is extended by 
accounts which are followed by at least 25 percent of the journalists or 25 percent of the editors. 
These data may prove useful to supplement research related to both the media content analysis and to 
all short-term components of the GLES. Furthermore, the communication, bonds and agenda-setting 
among gatekeepers and information authorities themselves can be the target of research. The gate-
keepers and information authorities constitute the source for corpus 3, the Twitter corpus of media 
agents. 
                                                          
 
3 We could only identify accounts that were publicly available. We did not search for accounts for which the 
account holder had decided to make it a “private” account in the sense that it is not shared with the public. 
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In defining corpora 4 to 6, the Twitter hashtag corpora, we took an alternative approach which was not 
restricted to communication around specific Bundestag candidates or journalists. To gain information 
about the political communication of the population on Twitter, we used thematic hashtags. Here, we 
defined three procedures which serve to generate three lists of relevant hashtags.  
 
This list is comprised of the common hashtags (abbreviations) of parties in the Bundestag (see appen-
dix) or of parties which are known to communicate substantially via social media (e.g., the party “Pi-
raten”). The list is complemented with the names of the party top candidates as hashtags (e.g., #mer-
kel). A collection of hashtags for the parliamentary elections in general (e.g., #wahl2013 [#elec-
tion2013]) completes the list. These hashtags comprise different conjunctions and abbreviations of 
election, Bundestag, and the year 2013 (see appendix). This list is the source for corpus 4. 
 
This list is based on the coding scheme of the media content analysis of GLES (GLES 2009). Wher-
ever reasonable, one or more hashtags were generated for each code in the coding scheme (e.g., the 
coding scheme used “Landtagswahl” and the corresponding examples for the hashtags included #land-
tagswahl, #landtagswahl2013, #landtagswahl13, #ltw). The main challenge in setting up this list was 
that not all issues could be transformed into meaningful hashtags because topics would become too 
broad and produce more noise in the data than valuable content. This list is therefore subject to a 
higher selectivity and less objective than the first list. This list is the source for corpus 5. 
 
In order to allow a more detailed analysis of the political communication on Twitter for a specific 
topic we decided to create a third list. This list was constructed to capture the communication around 
the NSA scandal. Snowden revealed that the NSA has been tapping communication around the world 
which quickly turned into a wide-spread discussion, generating a very large number of tweets in Ger-
many and abroad. This topic was specific enough and it did not include a wide range of sub-themes 
and could be covered by a limited number of hashtags. At the same time the issue is discussed exten-
sively by the media and we expect it to be relevant in the future as well. Especially so, since politi-
cians have taken up the issue and further fueled discussion. This third list is also different from the 
other two in such a way that it was not a predefined list (static approach) but three persons in our 
research team followed the discussion and added new relevant hashtags as needed. We started with 16 
hashtags and decided to add four more between July 22 and 25. This list is the source for corpus 6. 
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With the election the party AfD (Alternative for Germany) made an important leap forward. In the 
initial concept we had not foreseen these events. Therefore, communication about and from AfD can-
didates is not initially included in corpus 2 but 15 AfD candidates were added on the 27th of Novem-
ber 2013 to the Twitter data gathering procedure. While it is possible to collect tweets from these 
accounts back to the start of our data collection efforts, this is not possible for @-messages to these 
users or tweets including their names as a hashtag. Unfortunately, we are unable to add the Twitter 
communication for the other corpora because monitoring could only be implemented in real-time 
making it impossible to capture past events. To keep the data consistent with the overall approach we 
did not include Tweets from and about AfD in the corpora definition. 
Because Facebook posts are more persistent we were able to include data of the candidates of the 
party AfD. The Facebook walls of AfD candidates for corpus 1 were re-fetched and are part of the 
corpus definition. 
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For corpus 1, the Facebook data were collected and analyzed using the purpose-built software applica-
tion Social Data Analytics Tool (SODATO). This tool allows examining public interactions on the 
Facebook walls of Bundestag candidates by extracting several conceptual core types of information: 
Breadth of engagement (on how many Facebook walls do individuals participate); depth of engage-
ment (how frequently do individuals participate); specific analytical issues such as modes of address 
(measured use of first person, second person, and third person pronouns); the expression of emotion 
(positive, negative, and neutral sentiment); the use of resources such as webpages and YouTube vide-
os; verbosity; and extent of participation. In the case of modes of address and expression of emotion, 
one can examine how they evolve over time.  
 
Social media analytics can be undertaken in at least two main ways – “Social Graph Analytics” and 
“Social Text Analytics” (Vatrapu, 2013). Social graph analytics is concerned with the structure of the 
relationships emerging from social media use. It focuses on identifying the actors involved, the activi-
ties they undertake, and the artefacts they create and interact with. Social text analytics is more con-
cerned with the substantive nature of the interactions, it focuses on the topics discussed and how they 
are discussed: What keywords appear? What pronouns are used? How far are negative or positive 
sentiments expressed?  
These two types of data, we argue, can provide measures of the extent to which the Facebook walls 
are serving as online public spheres in that: 
 The graphical or structural data allow us to map the breadth of the public sphere by reporting 
the overall number of posts made, which of the walls received most posts and whether they 
linked out to other sources of information. In addition to looking at the posts in the aggregate 
we can also look at them individually and map cross-linkage across walls. Was the posting 
entirely independent such that individuals only posted on one wall or did they post more 
widely on two or three walls? 
 The social text data allow us to examine the depth of the engagement taking place through 
the Facebook walls and thus whether walls are acting as an online public space. In particular 
we look at three key aspects of the posts – their length, their focus in terms of the use of pro-
nouns in the posts – categorizing them as inward (use of ‘I’) or outward (use of ‘you’ and 
‘they’); and the direction of sentiment being positive or negative.  
The next section provides a technical description of SODATA (for an earlier version, see Hussain & 
Vatrapu, 2011). The tool itself can be accessed at http://cssl.cbs.dk/software/sodato/. 
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To fetch the relevant social graph and social text data from the Facebook walls, we used SODATO. 
SODATO uses and relies on Facebook’s open source API named Graph API. SODATO is a combina-
tion of web as well as Windows based console applications that run in batches to fetch social data and 
prepare social data for analysis. The web part of the tool is developed using HTML, JavaScript, Mi-
crosoft ASP.NET and C#. Console applications are developed using C#. Microsoft SQL Server is 
used for data storage and data pre-processing for social graph analytics and social text analytics. A 
schematic of the technical architecture of SODATO is presented in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Schematic of the technical architecture of SODATO. 
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The data is stored in a MS SQL server in the relational database format. The following attributes are 
available in the data set:  
Attribute Description Example 
DBITEMID unique internal database ID for 
each action 
00000000 
DBPOSTID unique internal database ID for 
each post (this is the parent with 
children objects like comments, 
likes and shares) 
0000000 
FACEBOOKPOSTID unique Facebook Graph ID for 
each post (this is the parent with 
children objects like comments, 
likes and shares) 
0000000000_000000000000000 
TIMESTAMP  Identify the date and time of an 
action, such as a like 
01/01/2000 00:00 (stored as an 
internal number) 
LASTUPDATED Last date and time the post was 
updated  
01/01/2000 00:00 (stored as an 
internal number) 
EVENTNAME type of the Facebook action such 
as post, comment, share, like 
COMMENT 
ACTORID unique Facebook Graph API ID of 
the person that performed the ac-
tion 
00000000 
ACTORNAME Facebook username John Doe 
TYPEOFPOST type of post such as status, link, 
video, picture, poll, music, etc. 
status 
LINK the URL if present www.gesis.org 
COMMENTLIKECOUNT sum of likes for that particular 
comment 
4 
TEXTVALUE the text nice comment! 
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We collected all available data which was posted on Facebook between January 1, 2009 and October, 
31, 2013 to also cover the previous election. Table 1 provides an overview of the size of corpus 1.  
Table 1: Size of corpus 1, Facebook corpus of candidates. Showing corpus size for two time periods: 
(1) January 1, 2009 to October 31, 2013 and (2) 6 weeks before until election day in 2013. 
Feature 1.1.2009 – 31.10.2013 12.08.2013 – 22.09.2013 
Total accounts identified (walls) 1,669 na 
Successfully fetched 1,408 na 
Failed to fetch 261 na 
Total Posts 468,914 29,782 
Total Likes 3,057,603 722,629 
Total Comments 596,569 97,911 
Total Unique Posters 18,701 2,512 
Total Unique Likers 421,504 129,616 
Total Unique Commenters 122,801 27,046 
Total Unique Actors on all walls 488,621 na 
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In the following we describe the technical aspects of creating the Twitter corpora. The Twitter moni-
toring builds up on previous work by Thamm & Bleier (2013). As outlined above Twitter data is used 
to build five different corpora. Corpus 2 consists of tweets by and addressed to a fixed list of Bundes-
tag candidates. Corpus 3 consists of tweets by gatekeepers and information authorities (all are account 
names), and corpora 4 to 6 are the result of monitoring different lists of hashtags (see appendix). As 
data cleaning still needs to be completed, we currently can only preliminary estimate the actual valid 
size of the corpora. We estimate that the total number of relevant tweets is likely to exceed eight mil-
lion with over half a million different users. 
 
Applying the list of candidate names which have an active professional Twitter account in the 2013 
elections we used the Twitter streaming API
4
 to receive messages directly from these candidates as 
well as the retweets of and replies to their messages. We also collected the @messages/mentions and 
messages which included a hashtag from our lists. For that purpose we developed a software compo-
nent called TweetObserver that is instantly reading the stream from Twitter resulting from our query 
in a stable manner. The software needs to register as a Twitter application in order to continuously 
receive update events for the requested items from the Twitter service. For each account the search 
query includes the account ID and the name, so that the application is geared towards receiving tweets 
from a certain account as well as any mentioning of its name. The software was implemented in Java 
and relied on the Twitter library twitter4j
5
. The software is connected to a MongoDB
6
 in which we 
store the data in JSON format. In the following we describe the data structure of the tweets in the 
Twitter data set. 
  
                                                          
 
4 https://dev.twitter.com/docs/streaming-apis 
5 http://twitter4j.org 
6 http://www.mongodb.org/ 
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The collected tweets are in JSON format and contain at least the following attributes: 
Attribute Description Example 
_id  tweet ID  446226137539444736 
userid  numeric user ID 630340041 
screenName  alpha numeric user ID lkaczmirek 
createdAt  date of tweet 2014-03-19T11:08:00Z 
tweettext  text of this tweet @gesis_org is offering #CSES 
data, providing electoral data from 
around the world: 
https://t.co/phtZgGcIjs 
hashtags  internal collection of hashtags with the 
following attributes 
 
 start  index of the start-character (the position 
in the string as a number, the first letter 
equals index zero) 
23 
 end  index of the end-character (the position 
in the string as a number) 
28 
 text  the tag itself cses 
mentions  internal collection of user mentions with 
the following attributes 
 
 start  index of the start-character (the position 
in the string as a number) 
0 
 end  index of the end-character (the position 
in the string as a number) 
10 
 id  user ID of the mentioned user 145554242 
 screenName  screen name of the mentioned user (ac-
count name) 
gesis_org 
 name  name of the mentioned user GESIS 
 
The data corpus includes tweets sent from account names, tweets with mentions of those names and 
tweets which matched our hashtag lists. As analysis is still incomplete the statistics below can only 
describe an arbitrarily defined sub-corpus of our whole data set. We decided to report shortly on a two 
month period. Table 2 and Figure 2 present examples for unfiltered raw data in the time frame of July 
27 to September 27, 2013. Corpus 2 and 3 included 1,176
7
 accounts. The number of hashtags used in 
corpus 4 to 6 amounts to 224. 
 
                                                          
 
7 The number of accounts is higher than the pre-specified list of account names due to a list of additional screen 
names (i.e., handles) which had been kept from a previous, smaller project. Future analyses will exclude this 
overhead. 
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Table 2: Example of a portion of unfiltered data between July 27 and September 27, 2013 
 corpus 2 and 3 (candidates and agents) corpus 4 to 6 (hashtags) 
number of tweets 5,573,451 3,088,565 
number of handles 356,251 181,927 
number of unique hashtags 148,626 168,172 
 
 
Figure 2: Estimated frequency of the number of tweets per day for the period July 27 to September 27, 
2013. The green peaks coincide with the date of the candidates TV debate and the election day. 
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Although various research projects are currently using social media data, and particularly data collect-
ed from Twitter, almost no datasets are available for secondary analysis and replication. This is partly 
due to the complicated legal environment in which social media is situated. The terms of use of com-
panies generating social media data especially add to this effect. In terms of sustainability and verifia-
bility of research it seems desirable, however, to find feasible solutions for long-term archiving and 
sharing of social media datasets.  
Consequently, we outline requirements and conditions for archiving and distribution of social media 
datasets. For GESIS this means assessing the scope and requirements for archiving a social media 
dataset and identifying the differences to survey data which the GESIS data archive is used to dealing 
with and for which we can rely on well-developed tools for archiving, documentation and modes of 
distribution. 
In the following we outline three important areas in which the collected data pose challenges for ar-
chiving and distribution.  
Documentation, data structure, tools: Social media research so far is still in its beginnings and conse-
quently lacks certain standards and methodologies. This applies to both data collection and data analy-
sis. In order to enable re-use of archived datasets, one needs a good description of the available data 
and the data collection process has to be carefully documented, including the selected tools for gather-
ing the data, data cleaning strategies and data formats. We expect that this document helps to under-
stand what we collected and how we collected our data. We hope that it enables other researchers to 
compare our approach with others to understand the differences with other datasets that have recently 
been collected by other projects researching the German election through Twitter or Facebook.  
Data protection and privacy: Tweets and posts on public Facebook pages are openly accessible to a 
worldwide audience and users agreed that their posts and tweets are publicly available to a worldwide 
audience. However, users of social media platforms do not explicitly agree to become a subject of 
scientific studies. Some users might even expect data transience, especially with tweets. Awareness of 
these issues is rising among social media researchers (the Association of Internet Researchers AoIR 
for example has published some guiding advice for internet research)
8
; and ESOMAR has issued a 
guideline on social media research for market research.
9
 Still, comprehensive guidelines for using data 
from Twitter and Facebook for scientific purposes are not available. User accounts of individuals and 
institutions of public interest, such as politicians and parties, are often considered to be less problem-
atic than those of ‘normal’ users, who are less likely to be professionalized in their usage and aware of 
the publicity they create. Some researchers have decided not to mention user names in publications 
and to avoid direct quotes from tweets and postings. But there is little discussion on how to handle 
privacy throughout the process of data collection and storing or on how to apply anonymization strat-
egies effectively. When talking about anonymization, the following two privacy issues are often con-
sidered in discussions. The first issue is concerned with tweets/postings that are deleted after the data 
has been collected in a research project. A user may decide to delete a posting on Facebook or a tweet 
on Twitter at any time. If the respective tweet has been collected, it would remain in the database if no 
additional steps are taken to remove it. The second issue concerns user names that are mentioned by 
                                                          
 
8 http://aoir.org/documents/ethics-guide/ 
9 http://www.esomar.org/uploads/public/knowledge-and-standards/codes-and-guidelines/ESOMAR-Guideline-
on-Social-Media-Research.pdf 
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other users in tweets/postings. Users may mention other users’ names or real names in their posts on 
social media sites. In the context of political opinions one may find text which could be deemed sensi-
tive in its nature and may require extra consideration. A user might get associated with political dis-
cussions, even if he did not actively contribute to them. For example, a @username may be included 
in a tweet on Twitter like “hey, @username, are you going to vote for party ABC again?”. While it 
might be possible, to filter and anonymize names following the @username structure, it might be 
more difficult to identify and remove all mentions of names in texts. This makes complete anonymiza-
tion difficult in social media research.  
Providers’ terms of use: Social media platforms are mostly business corporations that want to protect 
their interests and maintain certain business models. As such, they might restrict others from using the 
data in certain ways. Collaborations between archives and social media platforms seem rare. The most 
notable case is the collaboration of Twitter with the Library of Congress. 
Having identified these main challenges for dealing with social media data in the archival processes, it 
follows that the social media research community would benefit greatly from a workflow for docu-
mentation and a concept for data sharing that is in line with social media platforms’ terms of service.  
Some first ideas on how access might be possible take into account that the GESIS data archive al-
ready offers controlled and secure access to sensitive data from surveys via the Secure Data Center 
(http://www.gesis.org/sdc). Subject to further investigation, such an approach might also be suitable 
for the use of social media data. A Secure Data Center could be able to resolve requirements of ano-
nymity and data protection. In the Secure Data Center well vetted researchers can work with the data 
in a protected work environment which is controlled by both technical and organizational safeguards. 
For example, researchers who want to work with data sign a contract in which they agree not to share 
the data, not to attempt re-identification of individuals in the dataset and to keep the data secure. Re-
searchers cannot upload or download any data and will perform all their analyses within an encapsu-
lated workspace. All analyses are subject to an output control. This high level of both technical and 
organizational control allows researchers to work with data that is not fully anonymized. Potential 
scenarios include enabling access only at a designated computer in a safe room or via a secure remote 
access – both in combination with signing a special user agreement to follow specific rules.  
A different approach that is suggested by Twitter itself has the additional advantage that it deals with 
some of the challenges of data protection and privacy. Instead of distributing the tweets and its meta-
information to a third party researchers are allowed to publish a set of tweet identification numbers 
(tweet IDs) without any further information (i.e. no tweet contents, no usernames). The main ad-
vantage with such an approach is that the tweets themselves are not made available to a third party. 
Nevertheless, using the Twitter API, tech-savvy users can fetch all necessary information from Twit-
ter and thus reconstruct a dataset on their own. An additional advantage or disadvantage is that the 
corpus of tweets automatically reflect the privacy settings of the users at the time of the download. 
Deleted tweets would no longer be included. Yet this method requires technical skills and tools to use 
the Twitter API and may not be able to include results from certain data cleaning or processing opera-
tions. Finally, contractual agreements with social media companies and providers would also solve 
many of the above mentioned challenges. 
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Our goal was to monitor the social media sphere as it relates to the German Bundestag election of 
2013. To achieve this goal we decided to build six different corpora. For corpus 1, the Facebook cor-
pus of candidates, we monitored how candidates for the German Bundestag present themselves and 
behave on Facebook. Information on the Facebook walls are fairly persistent in nature; as long as they 
are not deleted or modified they remain accessible. Therefore, we were able to include data in this 
corpus which had been generated back during the earlier election in 2009. Nevertheless, Facebook did 
only receive little attention by politicians in their campaign efforts at that time. The section on Face-
book data outlined some of the promising research opportunities with this corpus. 
For corpus 2 and 3, the Twitter corpus of candidates and media agents, we monitored how candidates 
for the Bundestag use twitter and also how gatekeepers (mostly journalists) and information authori-
ties (a prominent set which is followed by the gatekeepers) use Twitter. While historical posts are 
available on Facebook, the concept of tweeting does not easily allow for long-term access to postings, 
and especially hinders access to tweets from the past. Technically, we monitored the on-going discus-
sion making it impossible for us to look into the past.  
Corpora 4 to 6, the Twitter hashtag corpora, will offer several opportunities for future research. One 
possibility is to take a single hashtag to try to replicate earlier findings. We see other interesting re-
search possibilities in looking at the subset of hashtags for parties (corpus 4), in comparing the Twitter 
hashtag corpus of media topics (corpus 5) with the GLES media study or in studying the online dis-
cussion  with the special set of hashtags for the topic “NSA / Snowden” (corpus 6). The hashtag cor-
pora are probably the most complex ones and many questions need to be addressed concerning data 
cleaning before we will be able to start working with the data. The main problems arise from the 
“noise” in the data. As some hashtags are not very specific they refer to other topics unrelated to the 
political debates we try to monitor and may even be used differently in other countries and languages. 
Overall, this paper documents our data collection efforts, the scope and size of the corpora, and some 
of the problems we encountered in data collection. We also discuss the place of the corpora within the 
research literature about social media in the political sciences. In an effort to extend and foster such 
research we conclude with a discussion of the most prominent challenges in data archiving and dis-
semination. Once these issues are solved, a new phase of social media research can begin as research-
ers will be able to work on different research questions with validated and agreed upon corpora.  
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The following list contains all parties which were searched for candidates to be included in the corpo-
ra. Overall, 2383 candidates were included. Of those, we were able to identify 1669 Facebook ac-
counts which were the source for the Facebook corpus of candidates (also referred to as corpus 1) and 
1009 Twitter accounts which were the source for the Twitter corpus of candidates (also referred to as 
corpus 2).  
The list of parties included: 
 Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU) 
 Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern e.V. (CSU) 
 Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) 
 Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) 
 BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN (Grüne) 
 DIE LINKE (Linke) 
 Piratenpartei Deutschland (Piraten) 
 Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) [only available in the Facebook corpus] 
 
The following list contains the names of the newspapers and sources which were searched to compile 
the list of gatekeepers. We identified 76 gatekeepers and 100 information authorities which were part 
of the source for the Twitter corpus of candidates (also referred to as corpus 3). 
 Bild 
 Die Welt 
 Die Zeit 
 Focus 
 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
 Frankfurter Rundschau 
 Spiegel 
 Stern 
 Süddeutsche Zeitung 
 taz 
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Whenever a tweet included any of the hashtags in our lists as a hashtag (with the prefix #) we aimed to 
include it in one of the three Twitter hashtag corpora. The hashtags are the source for the Twitter 
hashtag corpora. The following list contains the 36 hashtags for the basic political topics and key-
words (the source for corpus 4): 
 
Topic Hashtag (#-prefix omitted) 
Party name CDU cdu 
  
union 
 
CSU csu 
 
SPD spd 
 
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen grüne  
  
grünen 
 
FDP fdp 
 
Die Linke linke 
  
linken 
  
linkspartei 
 
Piratenpartei piratenpartei 
  
piraten 
Politics in general Politik politik 
Names of top candi-
dates Angela Merkel merkel 
 
Peer Steinbrück steinbrück 
 
Rainer Brüderle brüderle 
 
Gregor Gysi gysi 
 
Jürgen Trittin trittin 
 
Horst Seehofer seehofer 
 
Sigmar Gabriel gabriel 
 
Philipp Rösler rösler 
 
Claudia Roth roth 
 
Katja Kipping kipping 
 
Bernd Schlömer schlömer 
Election in general 
 
bundestagswahl 
  
bundestagswahl2013 
  
bundestagswahl13 
  
btw 
  
btw2013  
  
btw13 
  
wahl 
  
wahl2013 
  
wahl13 
  
wahljahr 
  
wahljahr2013 
  
wahljahr13 
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The following list contains the 175 hashtags for the media content keywords (the source for corpus 5): 
Topic Hashtag (#-prefix omitted) 
Wahlkampf wahlkampf 
Wahlprogramm wahlprogramm 
Parteiprogramm parteiprogramm 
Wahlkampagnen wahlkampagne 
Wahlwerbung wahlwerbung 
Fernseh-Wahlkampf wahlwerbespot 
TV-Duell der Spitzenkandidaten tvduell 
TV-Elefantenrunde der Parteivorsitzenden elefantenrunde 
Wahlbeteiligung wahlbeteiligung 
Direktmandate direktmandat 
Überhangmandate überhangmandat 
Wahlrecht/Wahlrechtsreform wahlrecht 
 
wahlrechts 
 
wahlrechtsreform 
Landtagswahl landtagswahl 
 
landtagswahl2013 
 
landtagswahl13 
 
ltw 
 
ltw2013 
 
ltw13 
Landtagswahl Bayern ltwbayern 
Landtagswahl Hessen ltwhessen 
Mitspracherechte der Bürger bürgerentscheid 
 
mitsprache 
Direkte Demokratie/Volksabstimmungen volksentscheid 
 
volksabstimmung 
 
direktedemokratie 
Politikverdrossenheit politikverdrossenheit 
Bundeswehr bundeswehr 
Auslandseinsätze auslandseinsatz 
Euro-Hawk-Affäre eurohawk 
 
drohnen 
Amigo-Affäre amigoaffäre 
Datenschutz datenschutz 
Staatliche Überwachung überwachung 
 
prism 
Verkehrspolitik verkehrspolitik 
Energiepolitik energiepolitik 
 
atomkraft 
 
atomenergie 
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Topic Hashtag (#-prefix omitted) 
 
atomausstieg 
 
energiewende 
 
antiatom 
 
antiakw 
Endlagerung endlagerung 
 
gorleben 
Netzpolitik netzpolitik 
Umweltpolitik umweltpolitik 
 
ökosteuer 
 
klimaschutz 
 
klimawandel 
 
hochwasserhilfe 
Sozialpolitik sozialpolitik 
Familienpolitik familienpolitik 
 
betreuungsgeld 
 
herdprämie 
 
elterngeld 
Verteilungsgerechtigkeit einkommensgerechtigkeit 
 
einkommensungleichheit 
Armut kinderarmut 
 
altersarmut 
 
einkommensschere 
Frauenquote frauenquote 
Rentenpolitik rentenpolitik 
 
rentenreform 
Integrationspolitik integrationspolitik 
Gesundheitspolitik gesundheitspolitik 
Arbeitsmarktpolitik arbeitsmarktpolitik 
 
arbeitslosigkeit 
 
jugendarbeitslosigkeit 
 
hartz4 
 
hartziv 
 
hartz 
 
agenda2010 
Lohnpolitik lohnpolitik 
 
mindestlohn 
 
fachkräftemangel 
Wirtschaftspolitik wirtschaftspolitik 
 
wirtschaftslage 
 
finanzkrise 
 
wirtschaftskrise 
 
bankenkrise 
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Topic Hashtag (#-prefix omitted) 
 
ezb 
 
bankenaufsicht 
 
bafin 
 
troika 
Finanzpolitik finanzpolitik 
 
staatshaushalt 
 
staatsdefizit 
 
steuerpolitik 
 
steuern 
 
steuerreform 
 
finanzmarktsteuer 
 
finanztransaktionssteuer 
 
steuergeschenke 
 
solidaritätszuschlag 
 
soli 
 
länderfinanzausgleich 
Bildungspolitik bildungspolitik 
 
schulpolitik 
 
hochschulpolitik 
 
forschungspolitik 
 
kulturpolitik 
Politiker allgemein politiker 
Bundespräsident bundespräsident 
 
gauck 
Bundesregierung bundesregierung 
 
bundesreg 
Bundesminister bundesminister 
 
minister 
 
westerwelle 
 
friedrich 
 
leutheusser 
 
schäuble 
 
rösler 
 
vonderleyen 
 
aigner 
 
maiziere 
 
bahr 
 
ramsauer 
 
altmaier 
 
johannawanka 
 
niebel 
 
pofalla 
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Topic Hashtag (#-prefix omitted) 
 
schroeder_k 
Bundestag bundestag 
CDU/CSU-Fraktion cdufraktion 
 
csufraktion 
SPDFraktion spdfraktion 
Bündnis 90/Die grünen-Fraktion grünefraktion 
FDP-Fraktion fdpfraktion 
Piraten-Fraktion piratenfraktion 
Koalitionen allgemein koalition 
Große Koalition (prospektiv) großekoalition 
Rot-Grüne Koalition (prospektiv) rotgrün 
Rot-Gelb-Grüne Koalition (prospektiv) ampelkoalition 
Schwarz-Gelbe Koalition (aktuell) schwarzgelb 
Schwarz-Grüne Koalition (prospektiv) schwarzgrün 
Schwarz-Gelb-Grüne Koalition (prospektiv) jamaikakoalition 
 
schwampel 
Bundesrat bundesrat 
Landtag landtag 
Bundesverfassungsgericht bundesverfassungsgericht 
 
verfassungsgericht 
 
bverfg 
 
verfassungsrichter 
Ministerpräsidenten kretschmann 
 
seehofer 
 
wowereit 
 
platzeck 
 
böhrnsen 
 
olafscholz 
 
bouffier 
 
sellering 
 
stephanweil 
 
hannelorekraft 
 
dreyer 
 
krampkarrenbauer 
 
tillich 
 
haseloff 
 
albig 
 
lieberknecht 
Junge Union (JU) jungeunion 
Jungsozialisten in der SPD (Jusos) jusos 
Grüne Jugend grünejugend 
Junge Liberale (JULis) jungeliberale 
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Topic Hashtag (#-prefix omitted) 
Linksjugend (solid) linksjugend 
Parteitag parteitag 
Infratest dimap infratestdimap 
 
infratest 
TNS emnid tnsemnid 
FORSA forsa 
Forschungsgruppe Wahlen forschungsgruppewahlen 
 
politbarometer 
Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach allensbach 
 
The following list contains the 20 hashtags for the case study "NSA / Snowden"  
(the source for corpus 6): 
Topic Hashtag (#-prefix omitted) 
Edward Snowden snowden 
 
snowdenasyl 
 
snowstorm22 
 
Snowden_to_Germany 
NSA nsa 
Prism prism 
 
antiprism 
Tempora tempora 
XKeyscore XKeyscore 
Discussion in Germany abhörskandal 
 
spionage 
 
bda 
 
vds 
 
gegenvds 
 
uanm 
 
bnd 
 
supergrundrecht 
 
stopwatchingus 
Other Whistleblower 
 
YesWeScan 
 
